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Philosophers are most successful when they open up new research avenues by
questioning the validity of existing paradigms. By countering behaviorist schools of
thought and introducing his theories on generative/universal grammar, Noam
Chomsky has been a key figure in (re)conceptualizing structural linguistics,
biolinguistics and the cognitive turn in psychology. Can he also induce paradigmatic
turnovers in the emerging, and in many instances, opposing field of evolutionary
linguistics? In Why Only Us: Language and Evolution, Chomsky teams up with
computational scientist Robert Berwick and gives a summary account of the what,
who, where, when, how and why of generative grammar which they assume
underlies the capacity for human language.
In the first chapter, ‘‘Why now,’’ the authors address the what of the language
capacity. The human language capacity is characterized by three components: a
sensorimotor system that enables language ‘‘output,’’ i.e., the production of speech
or gestures; a conceptual–intentional system that provides the ‘‘input’’ of language,
thought that underlies the lexicon; and a cognitive ‘‘processor’’ they call Merge that
underlies generative grammar by building syntax. The first component enables
‘‘externalization,’’ and the latter two are ‘‘internal’’ to the organism; and of all three
components, they characterize Merge as the ‘‘Basic Property’’ of language. Merge is
a cognitive, combinatorial operator or ‘‘internal computational system,’’ under-
standable through set theory, ‘‘that builds hierarchically structured expressions with
systematic interpretations’’ at the interface with the other two systems (11). Merge
enables generative grammar which is conjectured to be uniform across all
languages. The authors assume that the cognitive capacity is genetically
underpinned (the point where ‘‘generative’’ grammar becomes ‘‘universal’’).
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In chapter two, ‘‘Biolinguistics Evolving,’’ they further explain that Merge
enables linguistic properties such as displacement, i.e., dissociation or the
possibility to think and talk about not-now-existing and never-existing entities,
and recursion that enables the hierarchical combination of sets to potentially go on
ad infinitum. Animal communication systems, on the other hand, are syntactically
linear rather than hierarchical, and associative instead of dissociative, because they
are confined to real-life social or physical events that remain connected to emotional
responses and ‘‘actor-action-goals schemata.’’ Only humans evolved the capacity to
Merge, though they share, with other animals, aspects of the sensorimotor system
responsible for externalization, and the conceptual–intentional system responsible
for thought.
Generative grammar is thus argued to differ from animal communication
systems, which brings the authors to the who, when, and where questions. Building
on paleo-anthropological observations that point out a discrepancy between the first
emergence of anatomically modern humans in the fossil record in Africa
200,000 years ago, and the first display of symbolic, modern behavior by humans
in the archeological record 80,000 years ago, they conjecture that only behaviorally
modern humans evolved Merge. And because Merge is uniform across all languages
and thus shared by all humans, they hypothesize that the trait must have evolved
before the final diaspora out-of-Africa that occurred some 60,000 years ago. This
leaves a relatively small window for Merge to evolve, and they conclude that Merge
must therefore have evolved rapidly. They explain this point further during their
discussion of the how of language, but first we focus on their why.
Humans share with other animals a ‘‘secondary’’ system that enables commu-
nication about social and physical events. But Merge is understood as a facilitator
for internal thought, because it enables recursive, hierarchical structuring and a
dissociation of language with emotional triggers induced by real-life events. That
language evolved ‘‘for’’ communication in a social context is today the mainstream
view among evolutionary linguists, especially those in the Evolang community.
Chapter three, ‘‘Language Architecture and its Importance for Evolution,’’ therefore
reads as a critique and a reply to comments, as well as a defense of the old
philosophical idea that language is ‘‘for’’ inner thought.
The how of language is somewhat scattered throughout the book, and together
with the other questions, summarized in the final chapter, ‘‘Triangles in the Brain.’’
The authors assume that the capacity to Merge must be genetically underpinned, and
it must have evolved rapidly in humans, causing a discontinuity with animal
communication systems. By taking the evidence on recent changes in regulatory
genes, including the FOXP2 gene, as an exemplar, they examine how epigenetic and
evo-devo schools today conceptualize genetic change and how genes can underlie
the emergence of anatomical and neurocognitive form. They conjecture that the
cognitive operation to Merge results from a small change in an enhancer sequence
that prolonged the transcription of the associated gene in the brain, leading to a new
neural circuitry that underlies the evolution of the capacity. They find evidence for
this suggestion in comparative brain analyses of human infants, adults and
macaques. Broca’s area that contains Brodmann areas 44 and 45, and Wernicke’s
area are connected to one another by fiber tracts. Diffusion Tensor Imaging of these
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fibers shows that in adult humans there is a tract connecting the superior temporal
cortex to the premotor cortex which the authors consider to be involved in auditory–
motor mapping. Another tract connects the superior temporal cortex to Brodmann
area 44, which for the authors might be connected to processing sentence syntax.
Ventrally, two fiber tracts link Brodmann area 45, the seat of the lexicon, and the
ventral inferior frontal cortex to the temporal cortex. These tracts form a complete
ring in adult humans. In human infants, however, the dorsal pathways connecting to
Broca’s area are not yet myelinated, and in homologous areas of the Macaque brain,
some of the fiber tracts are missing. Berwick & Chomsky suggest that ‘‘the dorsal
and ventral fiber tracts together form a complete ‘ring’ that moves information from
the lexicon to the areas on the dorsal side where it is used by Merge. The key idea is
that the fiber-tract ‘ring’ must be in place in order that syntactic processing work’’
(161). This indicates that newborns are not yet wired up for syntax, although their
auditory processing is fully in place. The fiber tracts for syntax mature during
development, and the authors point toward a possible small change in gene
regulation affecting the growth factor of these fiber tracts for completing the ring.
In preparing this review, I checked the existing reviews of Berwick and
Chomsky’s book, and most, apart from Tattersall’s (2016), were rather negative.
This is no surprise. Many scholars active in evolutionary linguistics endorse the idea
that language is an adaptation that evolved for social communication by means of
gradual natural selection, and they have often developed these ideas by opposing
Chomskyan linguistics. What caught my eye were the fundamental misunderstand-
ings of Chomsky’s theory. The field of language origin and evolution studies today
is mostly made up of (computational) linguists turned Neo-Darwinian, and to a
lesser extent it includes evolutionary psychologists, anthropologists, archaeologists
and primatologists. Given their training, these scholars lack the theoretical
background to understand the roots and ideas behind generative grammar. One
reviewer even conjectured that Chomsky’s generative grammar, characterized by
Merge, is ‘‘mysterious.’’ But such is hardly the case. The roots for his theory on
grammar lie in philosophy, and one of its subdisciplines, mathematical logic, fields
that are almost never considered in Evolang conference calls. The theory on
generative grammar looks at full-blown language and tries to find the logical,
mathematical-like structure common to all grammars. This common structure can
be explained by combinatorial set theory, where discrete elements such as X and Y
become combined into sets {X, Y}, {Y, X}, {X, X, Y}, {X, Y, X}, {X, Y, X, Y},
etc. Each set is obtained by following algorithmic rules for calculation or
recombination of the parts, and each set creates new meaning. We can derive such a
logical structure from syntax, but also from mathematics or theory of mind (I know,
you know, that I know …). Falsifying this characterization of syntax would imply
either of the following: one should prove that set theory is wrong; or one should
prove that our mind does not actually process data according to set theory, which
would imply that set theory is the product of sociocultural learning; or one should
prove that animal communication or nonverbal communication also follows
combinatorial structuring similar to hierarchical set theory. At present, none of these
has been proven. Therefore, I cannot but agree with the authors: A research
reorientation toward aspects of what they call ‘‘externalization’’ or the ‘‘intentional–
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conceptual system’’ in and of itself does not falsify the theory of the logic of
generative grammar.
Second, the authors do not oppose general evolutionary theory when they argue
that the capacity for Merge might not be an adaptation; and that, if it did evolve,
there is no reason to assume that it evolved gradually and by means of natural
selection. When Chomsky first formulated his theory of syntax, he did so by making
use of a jargon that is associated with general systems theory and hierarchy theory,
where concepts such as division of labor, self-organization, phase transitions and
critical thresholds emerged. While not part of the Modern Synthesis, this jargon has
since been incorporated into an Extended Synthesis via epigenetics and eco-evo-
devo schools that provide plausible evolutionary theories for how the rapid
evolution of traits can come about. These theories, furthermore, help explain why
aspects of the sensorimotor system appear to be shared with other animals. As the
authors note, we share with song birds many of the neural circuits that enable speech
production, and gene regulatory mechanisms might underlie developmental
constraints on how such a system evolves. Chapter One also gives a very nice
overview of neutral theory, otherwise known as genetic drift, a mechanism that
today is well-recognized to be more important than selection, especially with
regards to the preservation, spread and most of all loss of adaptive traits. And
because they implement Tattersall’s work on the dissociation between the first
appearance of humans and the first evidence of modern, symbolic behavior, they
also apply jargon associated with punctuated equilibria theory. In comparison with
the rising evolutionary linguistic canon that unjustifiably lags behind in implemen-
tation of the Extended Synthesis, the work of Berwick and Chomsky reads as very
up-to-date and refreshing.
Nonetheless, some claims are merely posited, and not well argued for. The idea
of precursors to language, or a protolinguistic phase, for example, is wiped off the
table in one sentence (72). This, of course, depends upon how we define
protolanguage, but on their view, at one point in time our ancestors would have
possessed a fully developed sensorimotor brain ready to put to use for commu-
nication on social and physical events. And they would have had an evolving
conceptual–intentional system that underlies mental concepts. But lacking the
capacity for Merge, they would have been unable to cognitively order or externalize
any of their evolving ‘‘concepts’’ or ‘‘ideas.’’ This point seems too radical,
especially given that scholars have now aptly demonstrated that aspects of
nonverbal communication such as pointing, or vocal calls associated with emotions
in humans and other primates convey meaning to both actors and recipients. The
authors, however, and probably following philosophers such as Quine, deny that
language, here understood as the lexicon, bears any reference to the external world,
be it social or physical. Instead, they understand concepts, ideas and words to
originate in the mind, what they call ‘‘mind-dependent entities’’ (84–5), where they
function as requirements for inner thought. Though it is true that we are born with
what philosophers used to call inborn categories of the mind, and though we might
even assume that ideas, concepts and words are creative inventions by individuals, it
is equally true, as anthropologists have long demonstrated, that in order for such
ideas or words to become part of a society’s lexicon, sociocultural transmission is
110 Metascience (2017) 26:107–111
123
Author's personal copy
required. We learn many words and concepts from the community we live in, and
such learning is first and foremost a social endeavor. Following their scenario, what
is lacking is an explanation of why communication about social and physical events,
which can be understood as a form of ‘‘associative’’ protolanguage that works well
in other animals, became secondary; when syntactic language took over; and when
inner thought became dissociated from the world. Instead, the reader is left with an
extreme rationalist and even solipsistic view on cognitive content.
Nonetheless, this book primarily deals with grammar, which indeed needs to be
placed on any evolutionary linguistic agenda. But one can rightfully wonder
whether the origin of grammar can be so easily decoupled from the conceptual–
intentional system, the ‘‘externalization’’ of language as the authors call it, and the
sociocultural dimensions that accompany any modern language.
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